Introduction
The production of refined copper in the U.S. has always been concentrated in a few companies. During most of the post WWII period, the U.S. copper industry has had only three major producers: Anaconda, Kennecott, and Phelps Dodge. These three companies are integrated producers, who supply their smelters and refineries with company-mined ores. There exist also the so-called "custom smelters" companies, which refine copper produced by nonaffiliated firms. There have been two major custom smelter firms during the period 1950-95: Amax and Asarco. Hence, even when the custom smelter firms are considered as relevant actors in this market, we are speaking of only five firms at most.
1 Figures 1 and 2 show the smelting and refining capacity of the top three and top five companies respectively, compared to the total industry for the period 1955-95. The percentages of the total industry capacity owned by the three biggest firms are, on average for the whole period, 73.8% for smelting and 61.9% for refinery. The same percentages for the five largest firms are 88.9%
and 79.3%.
Most of the transactions between producers and consumers of refined copper are done through one-year contracts that specify a monthly quantity with a price equal to the spot price at the day of delivery. In general, the spot price used in these contracts is the price determined in auction markets like the London Metal 1955 1958 1960 1963 1965 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Year Thousands Tons.
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market, shows many fluctuations. Figure 3 shows the U.S. producer and LME monthly copper prices during the period 1950-1999.
As can be seen from figure 3, there are also some long periods of time when the domestic prices were much higher than international prices. During the 1974-76 period, for example, the difference between the U.S. producer price and the LME price was 9c //lb. on average, and the average charges for freight, insurance and storage were around 2-3c //lb. There is also some evidence that shows U.S. producers rationed U.S. consumers in 1954-1956 and 1964-1970. During these periods of time the LME price was above the U.S. producers price.
At the same time, the U.S. price of copper was below the price of scrap and 1950 1953 1956 1960 1963 1967 1970 1973 1977 1980 1984 1987 1991 1994 1997 month/year US cents/pound US price LME price the difference was lower than the conversion costs from scrap to refined copper.
These facts and the behavior of the U.S. copper producers were investigated by the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Government 4 , but no actions were taken 5 6 .
The most common explanation found in the literature (Fisher, Cootner and Baily (1972) , Mackinnon and Olewiler(1980) , Richard (1978) , Vial (1988 Vial ( ,1992 for the existence of the two-price system, is that U.S. producers set the price to reflect a sustainable and profitable long-run level of copper prices (taking into account their own resulting supply decisions). The idea behind this argument, is that copper producers consider that a stable price will lead to a higher present value of profits than a volatile price that fluctuates in response to short-run variations in supply and demand. Considering it in their own interest then to have a stable price, they take the price they set as given for the time being and decide the amount of copper they will supply at that price. When the LME price is above the US price, producers do not increase the price for two reasons:
-Customers who can use aluminum, the main copper substitute, can invest in aluminum-use machinery and then they will not switch back to copper for a long time.
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-Higher prices might be a signal of higher long-run prices and then new producers will enter (either new mines will enter or existing mines will expand capacity).
To explain consumers' behavior, who take the U.S. price as given but also have the option of buying imported copper at the LME, the argument is that it might be profitable to buy domestic copper even when the U.S. producer price is higher than the LME price, because that will guarantee access to U.S. copper during future periods of disequilibrium.
Some alternative and complementary explanations have been provided by Lal (1992) and Taylor(1978) . Lal thinks that export quotas in the U.S. 8 and other countries permitted the separation of the U.S. from the world copper market. This segregation gave firms monopoly power and the existence of no resale clauses in the contracts prevented arbitrage from occurring. Taylor uses a model of vertically integrated firms, where production plans must be made prior to the knowledge of price, to show that price smoothing increase the expected profits of the firms overtime. This is due to a smoothing of production flows and the increased price information available to the firms. An additional incentive for smoothing price would exist if firms have a preference for a stable profit flow overtime.
It is important to mention that some few authors acknowledge the existence of the two-price system, but think that it had no effect on the competitiveness of the U.S. refined copper market. Richard (op. cit.) , for example, considers that "the U.S. copper producers forms a relatively weak oligopoly" and that "arbitrage between the U.S. price system and LME prices keeps the two prices in line with one another". The main reason for this to occur is that the U.S.
secondary industry trades (mainly scrap) at LME prices and that assures the working of the arbitrage.
Independently of the reasons why the two-price system existed and if the U.S. producer price was a competitive one or not, it is a fact that the system ended during the late 70's. During early 70's the four largest copper-exporting countries (Chile, Peru, Zaire (Republic of Congo) and Zambia) nationalized their copper mines, which were owned mainly by American multinational corporations. Chile, then, in 1976, decided to replace the U.S. producer price by the LME price as a reference for its exports and it was followed by others. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explain the specifics of the copper industry and presents the models of demand and supply of copper.
Section 3 explains the data. Section 4 shows the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Copper Demand Function
Copper is mainly an input to produce durable goods and, therefore, the demand for copper is a derived demand. Immediate consumers of copper are mainly semifabricators (rod mills and brass mills) that use copper to produce intermediate goods that are then used as inputs by the end users of copper 17 . The main industries using semi-fabricated copper goods as inputs in the U.S. are, based on the Copper Development Association reports, electric and electronic products (for telecommunications and wiring devices), building construction (for plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and wiring) and industrial machinery and equipment. 15 The only study I am aware of is the one by Hartman, Bozdogan and Nadkarni (1979 ) . They simulate three pricing strategies: average variable cost pricing (P=AVC), full cost pricing (P=ATC), and collusive pricing (MR=MC). Then, the results of the simulation are compared with actual prices to conclude that the full cost pricing strategy is the strategy that best approximates actual prices.
16 See Bresnahan (1989) for a review of the methods used in this literature. See Porter (1983) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) for specific empirical applications of these methods. 17 Wire mills produce bare wires, insulated wires and cables; and brass mills produce mainly shapes (sheets, rods and tubes).
The production of durable goods is highly energy intensive and the main copper substitute in these industries is aluminum 18 . In the short-run, when capacity is fixed, the cost minimization problem of a firm producing durable goods is the following:
Where, The Lagrangian and the first order conditions for this minimization problem 18 The two main uses of copper in the US economy are building construction (40%) and electrical products (20%).
are:
Solving for the input levels from the first order conditions and plugging them back in the objective function defines the cost function:
Now, using Shepard's Lemma the conditional copper demand can be derived:
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with Hick's neutral technical
the following copper demand is obtained:
log C t = β 0 +β 1 log P c t +β 2 log P a t +β 3 log P e t +β 4 t+β 5 log w t +β 6 logK t (10)
Where:
Equation (10) is the demand function to be estimated in the empirical part.
3 Copper Supply Then, direct current is applied to the solution and the copper is dissolved from the anodes and deposited as refined copper in the cathodes. The final output is an electrolytic copper cathode (refined copper) with 99.9% purity, the final product for industrial consumption.
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It is also important to mention than during the refining stage some valuable 20 Copper can be found in several different kinds of deposits, the most common ones are: porphyry, strata-bound and massive sulfide. The mineral is then extracted from these deposits using one of two mining processes: open pit, used to extract massive depositis that are relatively near the surface, and underground, used for deep ore bodies. 21 Copper cements have between 70 and 77% copper content. 22 Copper concentrates have between 20% and 30% copper content. 23 It is expensive in the sense that you are paying to transport 99% of wasting material. 24 If the leached solution is rich enough, cooper oxides can be alternatively treated in a solvent extraction-electrowinning (SX-EW) plant whose final output is a copper cathode. With this process te smelting and refining stages are skipped, but some electrowon cathodes have less purity than electrolytic cathodes and they need to pass trough the refining stage anyway. 25 Copper anodes have between 98 and 98.5 copper content. 26 For a detail explanation of the technology of primary copper production see Whitney (1989) . Cathode by-products are recovered. Obviously, these by-products do not change the cost of producing refined copper, but they must be considered because they make production more profitable. Usually the type of by-products obtained depends on the geographic region of the mine, but, in general, the most common copper by-products are gold, silver, nickel, zinc, molybdenum and cobalt 27 . (1982) derive supply schedules from site-and input-specific cost data from 47 copper operations in the U.S. and they conclude that "unit operating 27 Copper ores in South Africa and Philipines are rich in gold; in Chile and the U.S. they are rich in silver; in Zaire and Zambia they are very rich in cobalt; and, in Canada they are rich in nickel and zinc. 28 The most common specifications is:
costs are constant up to maximum capacity". 29 Furthermore, people within the industry consider that a constant marginal cost is what best approximates their costs 30 . Assuming a production function with constant returns to scale, I can specify a log-linear constant marginal cost:
log MC t = α 0 + α 1 log w t + α 2 log P s t + α 3 log P e t + α 4 log P f t + α 5 t (11) where:
w : wages P s : price of silver P e : price of electricity P f : price of fuel t : time trend
Under the assumption of joint-profit maximization the problem of the U.S.
producers is:
The first order condition for this problem is: 29 The additional evidence they provide to support this conclusion is that "In the short-run, copper mines and mills vary output by increasing the numbers of shifts worked per week, thus keeping marginal cost fairly constant. Inventory control of concentrate is used to keep daily smelter production at a reasonably steady level. When a serious oversupply or undersupply of concentrates exists in inventory, the mine or smelter is shut down for a short period". 30 This comment is based on discussions with operating and management personnel of Enami, Codelco and NorDeutsche-Refinery, and several visits to their smelters and refineries.
Taking logs and considering that we want to estimate market conduct, this condition can be rewritten as:
where η is the demand price-elasticity, MC t is the marginal cost of the copper industry, and θ is a parameter measuring market conduct 31 . Using equations (11) and (10) and taking logs we have:
log P c t = α 0 +α 1 log w t +α 2 log P s t +α 3 log P e t +α 4 log P fo t +α 5 t−log
Defining D t as a dummy variable equal to one when the industry is under any cooperative regime and equal to zero when is perfectly competitive, equation (12) can be rewritten as:
log P c t = α 0 +α 1 log w t +α 2 log P s t +α 3 log P e t +α 4 log P fo t +α 5 t+α 6 D t (13)
Under any cooperative regime market prices should be higher than un-der perfect competition, and, therefore, α 6 should be positive but less than
As in Porter (1983) , if the sequence {D 1 , ..., D T } is known, equations (10) and (13) can be consistently estimated using two-stage least squares.
Data
The Table ( 2) shows the results of the two-stage least squares estimation of equation (10) using Prais-Winsten two-step procedure with AR(1). One of the potential issues to be considered is that if what the literature has reported is true about periods or rationing 37 , then the demand function cannot be estimated for those 36 These two periods were also the ones investigated by the Committe. 37 Most of the information regarding the rationing periods is anecdotal and the investigation of the Houthakker Committee provided few evidence about when rationing occured and for how long. There is no mention at all about which buyers were rationed, how allocations were determined and how resales were prevented.
Demand
In the literature, the existence of rationing has been basicallly inferred comparing the difference between the refined copper price and the price of scrap with the conversion cost of periods unless efficient rationing was used.
38 I deal with this potential problem in three ways. First I estimated the demand function assuming that efficient rationing was used (models 1 and 2 in table (2)). Second, I estimated the demand function adding dummy variables and/or dummy variables interacted with copper prices for the rationing periods. The coefficients of these variables were never significant and the rest of the coefficients remained almost unchanged 39 .
And third, I dropped from the sample the observations for rationing periods (models 3 and 4 in table (2)). The only difference between models 1 and 2
and between 3 and 4 is that in the first-stage regression of models 2 and 4, the prices of electricity and fuel oil were replaced by the fuel and power price index, allowing the use of the observations for the period 1950-57. 40 The coefficient for the Vietnam dummy variable was very close to zero and never significant in any of the models, so I dropped it from the final specification.
The copper price is lagged eleven periods to be consistent with the one-year contracts between producers and consumers 41 , reflecting then the average time that fabricators need to adjust their production decisions when copper prices change. 42 The use of lagged prices might imply that there is no endogeneity of prices, but as stated by McKinnon et al. (op. cit.) "U.S. producers know scrap into refined copper. However, conversion costs are estimated with a regression using a sample that excludes the rationing periods. 38 In the hearings of the Committee producers state that the buyers' past purchases were the basis of their allocation decision. See "Report on the Subcommittee on Copper" (op.cit.), page 10. 39 These results are not reported in the paper but are available from the author upon request. 40 Recall that the price of electricity is available since 1958. 41 A typical contract specifies the total annual tonnage, the monthly delivery and the point of delivery. The price is not specified, but states as "the seller's price at the time of delivery", where usually the LME or Comex spot price is specified as the seller's price. 42 This is an unanimous practice in the literature. Authors using annual data have lag prices one year and authors using quarterly data lag prices three quarters. that copper demand depends on lagged prices and they will take future developments on the demand side into account when setting producer prices". For this reason, and following almost everybody in the literature, I preferred the use of instrumental variables. As can be seen in the next section, I use the real wages of production workers in primary metal industries and the real price of silver as instruments. The estimated copper price elasticities are negative and significant, ranging between −0.35 and −0.43. The main purpose of this paper is to estimate market power, and, one of the key parameters for doing it, is the price elasticity. Hence, an estimated coefficient that is inconsistent or biased would lead us to wrong conclusions Following what many authors have done in the literature, I used the aluminum price lagged 11 periods. The reason for this is to reflect the fact that fabricators cannot switch from copper to aluminum instantly, they require to make some adjustment in the production process and to invest in some new equipment, and to do this takes time (at least one year seems to be the consensus in the empirical literature). The coefficient of the aluminum price was positive as expected for a substitute good, but not significant. Several authors have reported a similar result or even a negative coefficient. The main explanation found in the literature, is that the aluminum is not an equilibrium price but, as stated by Fisher (op. cit.) , "an unrealistic quotation which is either widely discounted or produces severe rationing on other occasions". The most common solution, at least when using annual data, has been to use aluminum prices from Germany, a competitive market. There are no monthly data available of aluminum prices in Germany, so I could not implement that solution and I decided to keep the variable in the regression even if it was not significant.
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The coefficient of the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) was positive, as expected, significant, and it ranged between 1.5 and 1.7. Based on the main 44 In Model 1, for example, the coefficient was −0.001 with a standar error of 0.023. 45 Some few authors have decide to drop the variable instead.
industries using copper in the U.S., I also estimated the models using the IIP for Durable Goods and the Total IIP, but the results were not very sensitive to the index chosen. I decided then to report the results using the IIP for Manufacturing because the R 2 was slightly higher.
The estimated coefficient of the Fuel Oil price has the expected sign, ranges between −0.07 and −0.11, and is significant. Even though the fabrication of durable goods is very intensive in the use of energy, especially fuels, many researchers have failed to consider an energy variable in the specification of the copper demand. Vial (1989 Vial ( , 1991 is the only one I am aware of who has included an energy variable, and he reports a range of elasticities between −0.06 and −0.15, with a mean of −0.0906. These numbers are consistent with the fuel oil elasticities estimated by the four models in table (2).
The time trend is negative and significant. I did not have an expected sign for this variable, but Vial (1991) shows that there is a decreasing trend in the long-run evolution of the intensity of use of copper, which might be explained by the replacement of copper by fiber optic in the electronic industry and plastic in the construction industry. The quarterly dummies were also significant, showing a negative seasonal effect during the third quarter. The dummy for the Korean war was positive and significant, showing a shift in the demand curve that reflects the increase in demand due to the war.
Finally, it is important to mention that some authors have argued that the change in inventories of fabricated copper products affects copper consumption and, therefore, it should be included in the estimation of a refined copper de-mand. There is no public information on total inventories of the fabricators, so, as a proxy, I used the change of total inventories of durable goods in manufacturing industries. The coefficient was never significant and the other coefficients were basically the same.
Supply Correspondence
As it was mentioned in Section 3, equation (12) 46 Table ( 4) shows the estimation of equation (12).
The coefficient of real wages is negative as expected and statistically significant in all models. The price of silver is positive and significant, with an elasticity that ranges between 0.075 and 0.093. It is true that this elasticity seems to be quite low, but it is statistically different from zero and that shows the importance of considering the copper by-products in the supply of copper.
Authors describing the copper industry, its physical characteristics and its technology have been aware of this (Budge (op. cit.) , Mikesell (1979) , Wangehals (op. cit.)), but the empirical work has usually disregarded the role of copper by-products.
The coefficients of Fuel Oil and Electricity prices were both negative and significant; they range between −0.04 and −0.43 for fuel oil and between −0.52 and −0.56 for electricity. The price elasticity of electricity is more than ten times higher, in absolute value, than the price elasticity of fuel oil, which might reflect that the electricity used in the refinery is a more important input than 46 I explored three alternatives: first, I set the whole sequence equal to one; second, I set the whole sequence equal to zero; and third, I set the first half equal to one and the second half equal to zero. The results did not change dramatically and the conclusions regarding θ were not affected. 47 At least the copper supply is more sensitive to electricity prices than to fuel oil prices. When the index of energy prices is used instead of fuel oil and electricity, the results do not change much. The estimated elasticity is −0.35 and is also statistically significant.
The strike dummies were never significant. This is not what I expected, 47 The total estimated energy requirements are around 9 million Btu per ton of copper cathod produced in the smelting process (roughly 2/3 in fuel and 1/3 in electricity) and around 6 in the refining stage (all in electricity). but I think is not surprising because they represent very short-periods of time with respect to the whole sample. The time trend is positive and significant, even though the coefficient is quite small. This variable should capture the technological progress in the production of copper. A very small coefficient like the one estimated, shows how slow and gradual the technology of producing copper has evolved.
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The coefficient of the D dummy was positive, significant, and it ranges between 0.28 and 0.32. This coefficient is α 6 , which represents the difference in the intercept of the supply relationship between the cooperative period (before 1978) and the non-cooperative one (after 1978) . Under the assumption that
the value of θ implied by the estimated coefficients of α 6
and β 1 ranges between 0.09 and 0.1. These estimates of θ are significantly different from zero, which represents a deviation from perfect competition (θ = 0), but such low values of the estimates are basically consistent with prices close to the ones predicted by a competitive model of the industry. Although the result might be surprising, given all the anecdotal evidence on the contrary, it is also important to recall that the value of θ must be interpreted only as the average market conduct of the industry for the period. Therefore, what the empirical results show is that during the period 1950-78 copper prices, on average, were quite close to competitive prices. 48 There is not much information available about the technological changes in the copper industry or the research and development efforts. In 1986, R&D spending of the U.S. copper industry was less than 1% of total sales and the national industrial average was 3.5% (U.S. Congress (op. cit.) ). The same report states that "there have been no truly radical technological advances in mining technology for at least several decades".
It could be argued that the results are also consistent with a symmetric Cournot behavior in the case of ten firms (θ = 0.1). However, as it was mentioned at the beginning, during most of the period there were only three major producers and if the "custom smelters" are also included, there were only five major firms in the market (which would imply θ = 0.33 and θ = 0.2 respectively).
It is possible that firms decided to switch to LME prices because the market was already competitive. In that case the zeros in the sequence {D 1 , ..., D T } should start quite before may of 1978, the exact month when the switch in regime occured. I explored this possibility assuming that the industry had became competitive either one or two years before may of 1978. For this purpose I estimated equations (10) and (12) again using two different assumptions for the sequence {D 1 , ..., D T }. First, I set the sequence equal to zero after may of 1977 and, second, I set it equal to zero after may of 1976. The results were very similar and the hypotheses that either α 6 or β 1 are different than the previous estimates is not rejected.
Finally, it is relevant to mention that the coefficient for α 6 is estimated quite precisely, the confidence intervals are between (0.052, 0.502) and (0.101, 0.533).
If the lower value of the lower bounds (0.052) and the higher value of the upper bounds (0.533) of these intervals are considered as actual estimates of α 6 , then the estimated θ would range between 0.022 and 0.142. This range still represents low market power and even the highest value (0.14) is less than symmetric Cournot with five firms.
Conclusions
Before 1978, most of the U.S. domestic copper production and an important fraction of the imports of refined copper were traded at a price known as the U.S. producer price, which was set by the major U.S. producers. At the same time, the rest of the world was trading copper at prices determined in auction markets like the London Metal Exchange (LME). It is a fact that this two-price system existed until 1978 and an important effort in the literature, has been devoted to show that the U.S. copper industry enjoyed monopoly power before 1978 and explain why that was the case. Less work has been done trying to test if that monopoly power was actually exercised or not and up to what extent. This paper tests empirically the competitive behavior of the US copper industry using the techniques developed by the New Empirical Industrial Organization Literature. The results are consistent with prices close to the ones predicted by a competitive model of the industry. Although this might be surprising, given all the anecdotal evidence on the contrary, it is important to consider that these results must be interpreted only as the average market conduct during the period 1950-78. It is still possible that the industry had exercised some market power during very short periods of time within this period and used a strategy of limit pricing to keep prices down on periods of high demand in order to discourage new entrants. This is a possibility that could be explored with access to more disaggregate data.
